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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Futures markets ordinarily perform two economic functions; they 
facilitate the transfer of risk from those who do not want it to those who 
are more willing to accept it, and they provide price discovery signals to 
the public. 
Futures markets are generally associated with agricultural commodi­
ties such as corn or soybeans. In recent years, however, futures 
contracts have been developed for financial instruments as well. Today, 
futures contracts exist for Treasury Bills, Treasury Bonds, Treasury 
Notes, GNMA certificates, and Certificates of Deposit. Contracts for 
Municipal Bonds and Federal Funds are awaiting regulatory approval. 
The establishment and growth of these markets have generated 
considerable controversy. Froewiss (1978) noted the concern of some 
segments of the financial press that speculative trading of financial 
futures might increase the volatility of spot securities prices (Business 
Week 1977a, b) . A joint study by the staffs of the U.S. Treasury and 
Federal Reserve System (1979a, 1979b) expressed concern that the existence 
of financial futures might complicate Treasury debt management or Federal 
Reserve open market operations. 
The controversy surrounding these markets has focused attention on 
their regulation. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is 
responsible for regulation of all U.S. futures markets. Under the 
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Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, CFTC approval is 
required before trading can commence in any futures contract. A contract 
is denied approval only if it can be demonstrated that trading would be 
contrary to the public interest. Ihis "why not?" test is based on the 
premise that futures markets ordinarily provide economic benefits unless 
there is a flaw in either the contract or the market. An advisory 
committee to the CFTC explained the rationale: 
The "why not?" test used by the Commission is founded on the 
perception that futures markets ordinarily provide economic 
benefits through hedging and price discovery. Futures prices 
guide production, storage, and consumption decisions which help 
the economy function more smoothly. The futures markets do not 
normally create risk, but rather permit already existing risk to 
be shifted to those most willing and best able to carry them. 
Thus, a futures contract which is likely to be actively traded 
on an organized futures market can be expected to provide 
economic benefits — unless it has a flaw. Thus, the "why not?" 
test is the correct approach (CFTC, 1976). 
If the premise that financial futures are valuable for forecasting 
and hedging is to serve as the basis for CFTC policy toward these markets, 
it should be supported by a solid body of empirical evidence. Therefore, 
a study of the hedging and price discovery performance of the CD futures 
market should be especially relevant for policy makers. 
Since July 1981, futures contracts specifying a negotiable certifi­
cate of deposit (CD) as the deliverable instrument have been traded at the 
International Monetary Market of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Before 
this time, commercial banks often resorted to using other futures con­
tracts - usually Treasury bills - in order to hedge against adverse 
movements in the interest cost of issuing CD liabilities. In the first 
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part of this study, the hedging performance of the CD futures market will 
be evaluated. The effectiveness of hedging short-term CDs with CD futures 
will be compared to hedges constructed with Treasury-bill futures. 
The second part of this study will be devoted to evaluating the 
price-discovery performance of the CD futures market. To do this, a 
direct test of the efficient markets hypothesis will be employed. 
Hedging Performance 
The increase in the use of interest-sensitive liabilities by commer­
cial banks during the 1970s has forced bank managers to be more conscious 
of the interest-rate risk inherent in mismatched maturities of assets and 
liabilities. If interest rates remain variable in coming years, banks 
will be forced to develop new techniques to manage interest-rate risk in 
order to satisfy customer needs and maintain profitability. Increased use 
of the financial futures markets for hedging purposes has been suggested 
as one such set of techniques. 
One maturity mismatch faced by banks is between term loans and short-
term CDs (CDs with maturities of 30, 60, 90 and 120 days).. For example, a 
bank may finance a fixed-rate term loan by issuing and rolling over a 
series of CDs. The bank manager does not know how much it will cost to 
roll over a short-term CD three, six, or nine months into the future. 
Interest rates could rise to a level higher than those expected by 
bankers. It is possible that interest rates could rise to such an extent 
that the cost of servicing the CDs would exceed the revenue gained from 
the fixed-rake loan. 
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The futures market allows those who anticipate a position in the CD 
market to avoid the consequences of unexpected movements in CD rates. A 
bank could sell CD futures in the contract month nearest the month the 
bank needs the funds and then offset the futures position when the CDs are 
issued.^ If the hedge is effective, adverse unanticipated interest rate 
movements in the spot CD market will be offset by gains in the futures 
market. Conventional wisdom suggests, however, that hedges will never be 
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entirely effective, so that interest rate risk cannot be eliminated. 
Before July 1981, CD futures were not traded so that banks often used 
ot&er futures contracts - usually Treasury-bill futures contracts - as 
hedging instruments. A study by Hicks (1980) suggested that the effec­
tiveness of hedging anticipated CD positions could be improved with the 
development of a CD futures contract. Market studies by the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade and the New York Futures 
Exchange showed that banks would use such a contract if it existed. As a 
result of these studies, the CFTC granted approval of CD futures contracts 
on these exchanges in the Spring of 1981. The expectation of all parties 
was that the CD futures contract would provide a vehicle for hedging 
short-term CDs that was more effective than Treasury-bill futures. 
^The strategy is limited in that CD futures contracts extend only 18 
months into the future. 
^The type of hedging strategy described here is known as a 
"microhedgeThis means the bank hedges specific interest-sensitivity 
mismatches. Alternatively, the bank could use a macrohedging strategy. 
With a macrohedge, the bank hedges the net interest-sensitivity mismatches 
calculated from the bank's consolidated balance sheet (See Short, 1982). 
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Since July 1981, CD futures have been traded on these three exchanges 
with almost all volume being at the International Monetary Market (IMM) of 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. At present, CD futures are traded in six 
different contract months with the underlying instrument being a 90-day CD 
from one of several large "no-name" banks. 
Although there are several studies on the hedging performance of 
financial futures markets, none has examined the CD futures market speci­
fically. Previous hedging studies were conducted before CD futures 
markets were established. Nearly three years have passed since CD futures 
began trading. The volume has been strong, especially on the nearby 
contract, since the start of trading. This is a large enough data base 
from which to begin assessing this market's hedging performance. 
Price Discovery Performance 
The second economic function of a futures market is price discovery. 
If the futures price is formed by fully reflecting all available and 
relevant information, the market is said to be efficient. Efficient mar­
kets ensure that the market is performing its price discovery function. 
The macroeconomic importance of market efficiency is derived from the 
role of prices as aggregators of information. When markets are efficient 
(in the sense of reflecting information), economic agents who make deci­
sions on the basis of observed prices will be allocating resources more 
efficiently. 
Both parts of the study will be of particular interest to the banking 
industry and its regulators. Bankers will be interested in knowing how CD 
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futures and Treasury-bill futures compare as hedges for short-term CDs. 
They will benefit from knowing whether or not hedging performance has been 
improved with the introduction of CD futures. 
Bankers will also be interested in knowing whether CD futures provide 
unbiased estimates of future spot CD rates. If the CD futures market is 
efficient, all available information should be incorporated in the futures 
rate. This rate will then represent the market's best guess of future 
spot rates. This information can help determine how much to charge a 
customer for a fixed-rate loan. The more efficient the futures market, 
the better it will be as a hedging instrument. During the life of the 
hedge, the futures price should change to reflect new information just as 
the hedgers expectations of future spot rates change in response to new 
information. If the futures market was not efficient, it would not do a 
good job of offsetting unanticipated movements in interest rates. 
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CHAPTER II. INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
To understand methods of evaluating the CD futures market's hedging 
and price discovery performance, it is necessary to be familiar with some 
institutional details of the markets involved. Therefore, a description 
of the spot, futures and forward markets for CDs will be presented as will 
a description of the T-bill futures market. 
The Spot CD Market 
The negotiable bank certificate of deposit, or CD, has served banks 
as a major source of funds since the instrument was introduced by Citibank 
in 1961. CDs form an important segment of short-term portfolios of cor­
porations, state and local governments, foreign central banks, and money 
market mutual funds. An active secondary market exists meaning that CDs 
can provide liquidity for investors - a characteristic that ordinary time 
deposits do not possess. The CD is important for domestic banks because 
it allows them^to tap the national market for funds. 
Large negotiable CDs are issued in denominations ranging from 
$100,000 to $10,000,000 and may be traded in a secondary market. Almost 
all CDs issued in the domestic market have a maturity of less than one 
year. Interest is paid at maturity. Market quotes are based on a bond 
equivalent yield calculation. 
The original investor agrees to deposit funds with the bank for a 
specified period - generally one, two, three, or six months. In return, 
the investor receives a certificate of deposit. At the end of the 
specified period, the holder of the CD receives from the bank the amount 
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of the original deposit plus interest. The original depositor need not 
hold the CD until maturity, but may sell it in a secondary market where 
the quality of the issuing bank, yield, and the time to maturity will 
determine the price received. The CD is treated as a money-market 
instrument by the investor because the deposit may be bought and sold in a 
secondary market, unlike ordinary deposits. A CD is treated as a deposit 
liability by the issuing bank. The bank must hold reserves and pay FDIC 
insurance on the amount deposited. 
The primary market for CDs consists of the issuing banks, the dealers 
who make the market in CDs, and investors. The issuing banks are 
segregated by risk into a number of tiers. Top-tier CDs are those of the 
largest domestic banks. These CDs are sometimes called "no-name" CDs 
because the quality within this tier is homogeneously high, and the 
investor is, therefore, indifferent as to which bank issued the instru­
ment. This homogeneity makes top-tier CDs a suitable delivery vehicle for 
a CD futures contract. The top tier consists of about 10 major banks. 
The second tier contains another 10 or 20 banks that may have to pay 10 to 
20 basis points more than the top tier. The third tier includes regional 
and resident foreign banks whose CDs trade at a rate 20 to 50 basis points 
higher than first-tier banks (Meek, 1983) . 
About 30 dealers are active in making a secondary market in CDs. 
Dealers normally maintain inventories of the first- and second-tier CDs 
for their customers. 
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Most volume in the CD market is in the one-to-three-month range. 
There is a market for six-month paper, but it is thin, and the market for 
one-year paper is still thinner. 
Bank CDs, unlike government securities, possess a degree of credit 
risk so that the bank pays a default premium on the CDs it issues, 
fbreover, it has been observed that during periods of rising interest 
rates, there is a flight to quality so that banks must pay an even higher 
premium in order to attract funds. Compared to the rates on Treasury 
bills, the rates on CDs will rise faster during periods of rising rates 
and fall faster during periods of falling rates. This is represented in 
Figure 2.1. This credit risk is an important difference between private 
debt and public debt. 
The CD Futures Market 
Futures contracts are standardized forward contracts that are traded 
on organized futures exchanges. Futures contracts are legally binding 
agreements which obligate the seller of the contract to deliver the 
commodity specified in the contract to the buyer at some future date at 
some fixed price. With a futures contract, nearly all physical aspects of 
the contract are standardized and homogeneous. Unlike the cash market, 
where maturity, issuer, price, quantity and other information must be 
explicitly stated, buying or selling a futures contract is limited to one 
variable — price. Thus, futures contracts allow ease of quotation and 
trading. 
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Source; Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
Figure 2.1. CD rates and T-bill rates compared 
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Two positions can be taken in a futures market. If a futures 
contract is purchased, the investor is said to have a "long" position. By 
purchasing a futures contract, the investor is entitled to accept delivery 
of the standardized commodity specified by the contract at some future 
date at a price determined when the long position is established. A 
futures contract may also be sold in which case the investor is said to 
have a "short" position. By selling a futures contract, the investor is 
obligated to deliver the specified commodity when the contract matures at 
a price determined when the short position is established. 
Specifications of the futures contract are identical for both long 
and short positions. 
Specifications of the 90-day CD futures contract 
The 90-day CD futures contract is similar to other futures contracts 
in that the terms are standardized with respect to the quantity and 
quality of the deliverable commodity and the location and time of contract 
maturity. Specifically, the CD futures contract calls for the delivery or 
receipt of a 90-day CD from a top-tier bank with a maturity value of 
$1,000,000. A summary of contract specifications for CD and T-bill 
futures are presented in the Appendix A. 
In the spring of 1981, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
gave permission to the Chicago Board of Trade, the New York Futures 
Exchange, and the International Monetary Market to trade a domestic CD 
futures contract. The IMM contract turned out to be the one that 
succeeded among the three contracts approved. The IMM had the advantage 
of being the exchange where the T-bill contract was traded. The spread 
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trade between CD futures and T-b ill futures was popular from the start of 
trading and a key source of liquidity in the IMM CD futures contract. 
Contracts currently extend out 18 months with delivery months in 
March, June, September and December. At any give time, then, there are 
normally six contracts trading. For example, in October, 1983, the 
following contracts were trading: December, 1983; March, 1984; June, 
1984; September, 1984; December, 1984, and March, 1985. When the 
December, 1983 contract expires, a new contract for June, 1985 will begin 
trading. 
The CD futures contract calls for the delivery of a 90-day CD between 
the 15th and the last day of the delivery month. Delivery is made to a 
Chicago bank that is both registered with the IMM and a member of the 
Federal Reserve System. Payment for the securities delivered is conducted 
through wire transfer of Federal funds. 
The quotation of contract prices 
CD futures are quoted in terms of an index. Tliis index is the 
difference between 100 and the annualized percentage discount yield (as 
opposed to the bond equivalent yield used in the spot CD market) of the 
underlying security. For example, if the annualized discount rate on a 
90-day CD is 8.5 percent, then the index price would be 91.50. 
On a hundred point index, each hundredth of a point is one basis 
point. This being so, the one hundred point index can be expressed as 
10,000 basis points. The basic CD futures contract calls for delivery of 
a 90-day CD with a maturity value of $1,000,000. If the underlying CD had 
a maturity of one year, each basis point would be worth $100 ($1 million 
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divided by 10,000 basis points), but the contract specifies delivery of 
90-day CDs. Each basis point is worth, therefore, $25. Given this, gains 
and losses in the market can be calculated. If the index price of the 
futures contract declines eight basis points from 91.54 to 91.46 (i.e., 
the discount rate has risen from 8.46 to 8.54), then the value of the 
contract has fallen $200. 
This method of quoting CD futures contracts preserves the traditional 
futures market relationship in which the long (short) position profits 
when the contract's price rises (falls). Because of the inverse relation­
ship between yields and prices on CD contracts, the traditional method of 
quoting CDs on a yield basis would not conform with the traditional 
futures market relationship. The actual price paid is computed by using 
the annual rate of discount expressed in decimals: 
net invoicing price = maturity value 
[1 4. (CD yield) day: " 
360 
where the maturity value on discount CDs means principal value. Maturity 
value on add-on CDs means principal plus interest payable at maturity. 
CD yield = (100.00 - Index Price) x .01. 
Costs of futures trading 
The costs of futures trading may be divided into two categories: 
commissions and margins. Commissions on futures contracts are assessed on 
a "round turn" basis, i.e., the commission covers both entry and exit from 
the futures market. All positions, long or short, must pay commissions. 
A round-turn commission on one CD futures contract is negotiable but is 
typically close to 50 dollars. 
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In addition to commission charges, margin money must be posted. The 
initial margin serves as a security bond to ensure contract performance. 
The initial margin is deposited by both parties to the transaction when 
the position is established. Margin requirements in futures trading 
differs from stock market margin requirements. In the stock market, the 
margin is a partial payment to purchase securities. An actual transfer of 
property ownership occurs. Margin in the futures market involves no 
transfer of property. Currently, the initial margin for CD futures is 
$2,000 per contract. 
Futures market margin requirements have a close relationship to daily 
price limits. Margin is generally set at a level to cover the possible 
financial loss that can occur during a single trading session. Currently, 
the daily limit move for CD futures is 80 basis points; therefore, the 
margin requirements is $2,000 ($25 x 80 basis points). 
A maintenance margin is usually set at 75 percent of the initial 
margin. For the CD futures market the minimum maintenance margin would be 
$1,500. The purpose of specifying a maintenance margin is to ensure per­
formance on the contract by protecting the contract holder against large 
accumulated losses. If the investor is long (short) in futures and the 
price of the contract falls (rises) to such an extent that losses exceed 
$500 per contract, i.e., the margin balance falls below $1,500, the inves­
tor will be advised to restore the margin account back to the original 
level of $2,000. These "margin calls" must be made in cash to the 
brokerage firm before the commencement of trading the next business day. 
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The daily settlement procedure of crediting or debiting the margin 
balance according to the daily price movements of the futures contract is 
called "marking-to-market." For as long as the futures position is 
outstanding, the contract will be marked-1o-market at the end of each 
business day. 
The size of the market 
The closing IMM index value and the total amount of open interest in 
all the CD futures contracts traded on October 25, 1983 are shown below: 
Table 2.1. Open interest on CD futures contracts 
(October 25, 1983) 
IMM Index Open Interest 
Contract (Settlement) (number of contracts) 
Dec. 83 90.40 11,956 
March 84 89.97 6,807 
June 84 89.65 3,409 
Sept. 84 89.41 1,076 
Dec. 84 89.18 238 
March 85 88.98 6 
Open interest is the total number of basic contracts which have come 
into existence and which have not yet been offset by an opposite futures 
transaction. Each basic contract has both a buyer and a seller, but for 
the purpose of calculating open interest, only one side of the contract is 
counted. Open interest is used as an indicator of depth and liquidity in 
the market. 
From Table 2.1, it can be seen that most of the open interest is in 
the contracts closest to maturity. For the December 1983 and March 1984 
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contracts, the average actual price of each CD contract was approximately 
$975,500. This price when multiplied by the open interest in these two 
contracts yields $18.3 billion. For the other four contracts being traded 
on this date, the total dollar value of open interest was approximately 
$4.6 billion. 
Figure 2.2 shows the growth of the CD futures market since its begin­
ning in July 1981. As can be seen from the graph, volume has been strong 
since the beginning of trading. The CD futures market is growing and 
today is moderately sized. It is not a thin market, but it is small 
compared to the T-bill futures market. Table 2.2 shows open interest on 
T-bill futures contracts traded on the IMM October 25, 1983. Comparing 
this table to Table 2.1 illustrates the relative sizes of the CD and T-
bill futures markets. 
Contracts 
25,000 r 
20,000 ' ïsSSïSs 
15,000 • p 
10,000 • 
5,000 - " 
Sept. Dec. Mar.June Sept.Dec.Mar. June Sept. Dec. 
'81 '81 '82 '82 '82 '82 '83 '83 '83 '83 
Figure 2.2. Average daily open interest on all CD futures contracts 
traded at I.M.M. (number of contracts) 
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Table 2.2. Open interest on T-bill futures 
contracts (October 25, 2983) 
IMM Index Open Interest 
Contract (Settlement) (number of contracts) 
Dec. 83 91.07 31,169 
March 84 90.68 14,264 
June 84 90.41 3,957 
Sept. 84 90.18 1,431 
Dec. 84 89.97 352 
March 85 89.97 109 
June 85 89.56 117 
Sept. 85 89.40 12 
The Treasury-Bill Futures Market 
The CD and T-bill futures markets are similar in many respects. Both 
contracts specify a 90-day instrument worth $1 million at maturity. Both 
are quoted on a comparable index. Both are traded on the same exchange 
and share some common delivery months. However, there are some 
differences in the specifications of the two contracts. 
First, the underlying security of the T-bill futures market is a 90-
day T-bill. Each issue of Treasury bills is completely homogeneous. 
There is no variation in the quality of the credit behind the bills. 
Treasury bills are the most standardized and homogeneous of all money 
market instruments. They also possess a high degree of liquidity. 
Second, the daily limit price move for T-bills futures is 60 basis 
points as opposed to the 80 basis points for CD futures. This means that 
the minimum initial margin will be $1,500 and maintenance margin will be 
$ 1 , 2 0 0 .  
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Third, when a Treasury-bill futures contract matures, delivery is 
made on the business day following the last day of trading. This is 
usually the third Thursday of the delivery month. This one-day delivery 
period differs from the two-week "delivery window" in the CD futures 
market. 
Finally, each contract is traded for a period of two years with eight 
contracts trading at any given time. This differs from the 18-month 
trading period for CDs. In October, 1983, the following T-blll futures 
contracts would be trading: December, 1983; March, 1984; June, 1984; 
September, 1984; December, 1984; March, 1985; June, 1985; and September, 
1985. 
Forward Versus Futures Markets 
In a fozrward transaction, a seller agrees to deliver goods to a buyer 
at some future date at some agreed-upon price. For example, a bank may 
agree to sell Federal funds tomorrow at a price specified today. 
Forward contracts are not standardized but rather are uniquely 
.specified to suit the individual needs of the agreeing parties. Specified 
in the terms of the contract are the price, quantity, quality, time and 
place of delivery, and the terms of payment. Because forward contracts 
are heterogeneous, they are not traded on an exchange but rather an 
informal, decentralized market. Margin is not maintained so that forward 
contracts are not guaranteed in any way except by the faith and credit of 
the agreeing parties. 
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A futures contract is really nothing more than a standardized forward 
contract. Because the futures contract is standardized, they can be 
traded easily on an organized exchange where only the price of the 
contract is subject to negotiation. Because margin is required on futures 
contract and because of the mark-to-market procedure, the performance on 
the contract is guaranteed. There is no risk of default as there is with 
forward contracts. Because of this, the futures market has more depth and 
liquidity than the forward market. 
Forward contracts are usually made with the intention to accept 
delivery on the contract. It is generally not possible to offset an open 
position in the forward market before maturity because forward contracts 
are non-negotiable agreements. To liquidate an open position in the 
futures market simply involves taking an offsetting position sometime 
before the contract reaches maturity and, in fact, most positions taken in 
the futures markets are offset before maturity of the contract. 
I 
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CHAPTER III. METHODS OF EVALUATING HEDGING AND 
PRICE DISCOVERY PERFORMANCE 
In this chapter, methods of evaluating the hedging and price dis­
covery performance of the CD futures market will be developed. In the 
first section, previous hedging studies will be discussed. The short­
comings of these studies will be identified and improvements will be 
suggested for evaluating the anticipatory hedging performance of the CD 
futures market. In the second section, a direct test of the efficient 
markets hypothesis will be developed for evaluating the CD futures 
market's price discovery performance. 
Evaluating Hedging Performance 
When reading the literature on hedging, one must be careful to 
distinguish between two distinct types of hedges; One involves an 
existing position in the cash market; the other is where a cash position 
has not been taken but is expected to be taken in the future. The former 
situation may be called a cash hedge, while the latter is known as an 
anticipatory hedge. The distinction is important because, although 
hedging in commodity markets is conducted primarily to protect an actual 
position in the cash market, hedging in the financial markets is often 
most useful for anticipatory hedging; i.e., hedging the interest rate at 
which one will borrow or lend (Franckle and Senchack, 1982). 
Hedging performance should be evaluated in comparison to the 
objective of the hedger. With a cash hedge, the objective of the hedger 
is to avoid the consequences of adverse changes in spot prices. In 
commodity markets, as well as some financial markets, the performance of 
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this type of hedge can be evaluated by comparing changes in spot prices 
with changes in futures prices; i.e., the hedge can be evaluated by 
looking at the basis.^ If spot and futures prices move together, i.e., 
the basis is stable, then the hedge is said to be effective because losses 
in the spot market will be offset by gains in the futures market. 
With financial instruments, the objective of the hedger is seldom met 
by constructing cash hedges. The main reason for this is that in order to 
hedge an existing cash position, it is necessary to have a storable 
commodity. A financial instrument is not storable because its identity 
changes over time. This problem becomes more apparent the shorter the 
maturity of the instrument. For example, one day after purchase, a 90-day 
T-bill becomes an 89-day T-bill, an 88-day T-bill the next day, etc. One 
consequence of this problem is that over time the cash market instrument 
becomes less like the instrument in the futures contract. As a result, 
movements in the market value of the cash instrument become less 
correlated with movements of futures contract prices. 
There have been several studies of the hedging performance of various 
futures markets (see Cicchetti, Dale, and Vignola, 1981; Hegde, 1981; 
Dale, 1981; Ederington, 1979; Hicks, 1980; Stein, 1961; Telser, 1955; 
Peck, 1975; Johnson, 1960; Ward and Fletcher, 1971; Franckle and McCabe, 
1979; Senchack, 1980; Working, 1953a, 1953b, 1970; and Parkinson, 1981). 
^The difference between the futures price and the spot price is the 
basis. If futures prices and spot prices move together, the basis will be 
stable. If they do not move together, the basis is said to be variable. 
When futures and spot prices do not move together over the life of the 
hedge, the hedger is said to be exposed to "basis risk". 
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However, none is concerned specifically with the hedging performance of 
the CD futures market. 
Ederington (1979) attempted to evaluate the hedging performance of 
the T-bill and GNMA futures markets by applying a cash-hedging model 
developed by Johnson (1960). Hicks (1980) also used this framework to 
evaluate the performance of the T-bill futures market for hedging 
anticipated spot positions in the T-bill and CD markets. 
In Ederington and Hicks' version of the model described above, it is 
assumed that the hedger anticipates taking a position in a spot market 
instrument. In this model, E(U) represents the expected change in value 
of a spot position between the time the position is anticipated and the 
time it is actually taken. 
(3-1) E(U) = X® E(S^ - S|._j^) 
(3-2) Var(U) = Var(S^ - S^_^) 
where X® is the maturity value of the financial instrument X that will be 
a spot market liability at time t (when the position is taken), is the 
spot index price at time t, and ^ is the spot index price at time t-k 
(when the position is anticipated), Var(U) is the variance in the change 
of spot market values. 
The expected change in value associated with hedging an anticipated 
spot position with a futures position can be represented by E(H): 
(3-3) E(H) - X=E(S^ - S;_^) + 
(3-4) Var(H) - Var (S^ - S^_^.) t (x'.^)^ Var _ pt+Tj 
. 2xjxf., Cov (S^ - S,.,, F»^ - F»T) 
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where K(X^ are brokerage and other costs of engaging in futures 
transactions including the cost of providing and maintaining margin. 
Futures market holdings, are measured in terms of maturity value of 
the underlying security. and F^*^ represent the futures price on the 
t+T contract observed in period t and t-k respectively. 
The proportion of the anticipated spot market position that is hedged 
is defined to be 3, where 3 = -X^ ^ /X^. Equations (3-3) and (3-4) can 
then be rewritten as: 
(3-3') E(H) = X® {(1-3)E(S^ - ^) + gE(S^ - ^) 
- - KCt-k) 
(3-4') Var(H) = [x*)2[Var(S^ - S^_^) + Var^F^+T - F^+T)] 
- 26 Cav(s^  _ S^ _,. 
The proportion of the anticipated position hedged, 3, will affect the 
expected change and variance of changes of the value of the hedged 
position. Holding X® constant, the effect of varying 3 on the expected 
change in value of the position can be found by differentiating equation 
(3-3') with respect to 3: 
(3-5) ^  . -X^[E(FC*T _ g J . ^ _ S^_^) ] 
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The effect of varying 3 on the variance of changes in value of the 
position can be found by differentiating equation (3-4') with respect to 
3: 
3Var(H) _ /-^si2r„a„_r„t+T _ _t+T^ (3-6) = [x»)'[2eVar[FC+l -
- 2 Co.(s^ - rr-C" 
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Setting 9Var(H)/83 = 0 and solving for the risk-minimizing B: 
(3-7) e* = CkvlS; _ St_k, pt+T _ 
The portfolio model provides a measure of hedging effectiveness. 
Although the risk reduction achieved by any one hedger depends on the 
chosen 3, the futures markets' potential for risk reduction can be 
measured by comparing the risk on an unhedged position with the minimum 
risk that can be obtained by hedging with futures contracts. The measure 
of hedging effectiveness is defined to be the percent reduction in the 
variance achieved by having an optimally hedged position as opposed to 
having an unhedged position: 
(3-8) e = 1 - [Var(H*)/Var(U)] 
Substituting equation (3-7) into equation (3-4') yields: 
-,t+T rt+Tii2 ^  1 \ I :rwr i ?s — ?s f 
(3-9) (x')^ {vat(S - S,_,,) -
icov(s^ -
t ) t t-k „ r^t+T „t+T 
Combining equation (3-9) with equation (3-8) yields: 
Var{S^ - ' "'t-fc) 
(3-11) e = 
where p^ is the population coefficient of determination between the change 
in the spot price and the change in the futures price. 
The parameter e can be estimated by using the sample coefficient of 
2 determination, R , for hedges of arbitrary length. Using the sample 
variance and covariance for the observed period, 3* can also be estimated. 
For example, Ederington and Hicks would estimate the effectiveness of a k-
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day hedge using the following equation: 
(3-12) (S^ - = a + bfpt+T - pt+T) + W 
However, the model has serious shortcomings when applied to either 
cash or anticipatory hedges of financial instruments. With cash hedges, 
Johnson's model is applicable only when storable commodities are being 
hedged. Ederington used a non-storable commodity — T-bills — and 
neglected to account for the problems caused by the violation of this 
condition. With anticipatory hedges, Johnson's model is not consistent 
with the objective of the hedger unless the yield curve is flat, i.e., 
only when interest rates are not expected to change. With anticipatory 
hedges, one is not hedging against adverse movements in the spot price 
per se, but rather one is hedging against movements in the spot price 
relative to the expected spot price. Ederington and Hicks did not 
adequately account for the hedger's expectations of future spot prices. 
To illustrate the shortcomings of this framework for evaluating 
anticipatory hedges, consider the following example. Suppose that a 
commercial bank plans to make a 6-month, fixed-rate loan for $1,000,000. 
Suppose also that this loan is financed by first issuing a 90-day CD for 
$1,000,000 when the loan is made (in February) and then another when the 
first CD matures (in May). The bank would like to lock in a rate in 
February for the CD that is issued in May. The bank does not need to 
hedge the CD issued in February, since this rate is known with certainty 
at the time the loan is made. The bank could try to hedge the May CD rate 
by selling short in February $1 million of June CD futures and then 
offsetting the futures position in May. 
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Assume that the spot 90-day CD rate is 10 percent in February. 
Suppose, also, that based on all available information, the bank expects 
the spot rate to rise to 11 percent in May. The price of the June CD 
contract in February is quoted at 88.00. 
Now suppose that spot CD rates actually rise to 12 percent in May — 
1 percent more than what was expected in February. Assume the CD futures 
are quoted at 87.00 when the hedge is lifted in May. All rates are 
annualized discount yields. 
The results of the hypothetical hedge can be represented by the 
following table: 
Spot Futures 
sell $1 million June CD 
futures at 88.00 
Buy $1 million June CD 
futures at 87 .00 
100 basis points 
February Spot CD = 10% (90.00) 
expected spot CD in May 
= 11% (89.00) 
May issue $1 million in spot CDs 
at 12% (88.00) 
surprise = -100 basis points 
= -$2,500. $2,500 gain 
In this example the surprise in the spot market (1 percent, 100 basis 
points, or $2,500) is perfectly offset by the hedge. With a good hedging 
vehicle, the bank can treat its expectation of the May spot CD rate as 
given and price the fixed-rate loan accordingly. By hedging, the range of 
future outcomes should be reduced so that there is less uncertainty about 
pricing a fixed-rate loan today. 
What is being hedged is not the change in spot prices as the term 
(Sj.- Sj._j^) of equation (3-12) implies. Instead, with an anticipatory 
hedge, the objective of the hedger is to avoid the consequences of 
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unwelcome surprises. The surprise, or rather the difference between 
future spot prices and expected future spot prices, can be represented by 
the following term: 
Surprise = 
where is the spot index price in period t, and is the 
expectation of the spot price for period t conditioned on information set, 
available at time t-k. 
The method used by Ederington and Hicks implies that the expected 
future spot price equals the spot price at the beginning of the hedge. 
However, for many hedges, the assumption that is not 
reasonable. Applying to anticipatory hedging a model designed for cash 
hedging is generally a mistake. The consequences of this error may not be 
too severe, however, since Ederington and Hicks look at hedges constructed 
for short periods of time. In these cases, it may not be unreasonable to 
suppose that the spot price is a good proxy for the expected future spot 
price. 
In general, the spot price will not be the best estimator of the 
future spot price, and because of this, a stable basis can no longer be 
regarded as an appropriate criterion for determining the effectiveness of 
a hedge. Consider the case where the yield curve is upward sloping, i.e., 
the market expects interest rates to rise. In such a case, one would 
expect the basis to narrow over the life of the hedge. Assume, for 
analytical purposes, that the hedge is lifted during the delivery month. 
If the futures instrument and the spot instrument are the same, then the 
futures price should converge toward the spot price at delivery. With an 
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upward-sloping yield curve, the basis at the beginning of the hedge will 
be wider than the basis in the delivery month when the hedge is lifted. 
The yield curve is an important part of the basis especially when 
short-term instruments, such as CDs and T-bills, are being hedged. For 
hedges constructed with longer-term instruments, such as GNMA certificates 
and T-bonds, this consideration is not as important because the flat range 
of the yield curve then becomes relevant. 
In conclusion, then, the method used by Ederington and Hicks to 
evaluate the performance of anticipatory hedges is reasonable if either 
the hedging length is short or a long-term instrument is being hedged. 
A Method for Evaluating the Effectiveness of 
Anticipatory Hedges 
A portfolio model of the general type developed by Johnson can be 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of anticipatory hedges. However, 
several modifications must be made so that the hedger's expectations are 
adequately considered. 
Assume, as before, that the hedger anticipates taking a position in 
one spot market instrument. Letting E(U) represent the expected value 
of a surprise conditioned on information available when the position is 
anticipated. 
(3-13) E(U|0^ = X®E(surprise I 
(3-14) Var(u| <j)|._j^) = (x® )^Var( surprise | <{)^_j^) 
The expected value of a spot market surprise offset to some degree 
with a futures position can be represented by E(H): 
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( 3-15) E(h| = X®E( surprise I 
(3-16) Var(H|$^_^) = (x^)^Var(surprise|*^ ^ ) 
+ ZXt^t-k Gov [[surprise, I'''t-k^ 
The "expected surprise" in equations (3-13) and (3-15) is, of course, 
equal to zero. Also, the term e[[f^^^ - I] can be shown to 
equal zero if and F^ ^  both represent the market's rational 
expectation of spot prices in period t+T. If this condition holds, then: 
(3-17) F^+T = E(8^+^14^) 
and 
( 3 - 1 8 )  .  K < \ » T l V k '  
THI is means that the term |can be rewritten as: 
(3-19) E([E(S^^^|+j) - E<S„TlVk"IW 
which, using the law of iterated projections as defined by Sargent (1979), 
can be rewritten as: 
(3-20) E[<S„i - . 0 
This result justifies the conclusion that if information is used 
rationally and if costs associated with futures trading are small enough 
to be considered zero, then the expected return on both a hedged and an 
unhedged portfolio will be zero. What becomes relevant in this discussion 
is the conditional variances and covariances of surprises and changes in 
futures prices. 
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Define, as before, the hedge ratio 3 to be: 
Substituting 3 into equation (3-16) yields: 
(3-21) Var(H|0^_^) = [x®}^Var( surprise | (t)j._^) 
- 23Cov[(surprise, „ 
As in Johnson's model, the measure in hedging effectiveness is 
defined to be the percent reduction in the variance associated with 
having an optimally hedged position as opposed to having an unhedged 
position: 
(3-22) e = 1 - [Var(H*|*^_^)/Var(u|*t_k)] 
In Ederington and Hicks' version of Johnson's model, the hedger chose 
a futures position that minimized the variance of changes in value of a 
hedged position. Risk minimization is not ordinarily consistent with 
expected utility maximization as hedgers would be concerned with the 
trade-off between risk and return. However, under the conditions 
specified in this case, the expected return on a hedged position is zero 
so that there is no trade-off, meaning that risk minimization will be 
consistent with utility maximization. 
Parkinson (1981) examined the link between hedging and utility 
maximization and formally defined the conditions where the risk-minimizing 
hedge ratio is consistent with utility maximization. In the discussion 
that follows, Parkinson's notation has been changed to conform to the 
notation used above. 
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Under the assumption that the conditional distribution of the 
surprise, (s - E(S |<)) )} and is bivariate normal, the 
trader's objective function can be expressed as a function of the 
conditional mean of the portfolio return: 
(3-23) Var (H|*[_%)]; > 0, < 0 
where 
(3-24) E(H|*^_^) = X® E( surprise I <j>|._j^) 
(3-25) Var = (x®)^ Var (surprise 
+ 2Xt%t_k Gov [(surprise, 
Costs of futures trading are assumed to be zero. 
The trader is assumed to be risk averse but is also assumed to be 
concerned with the expected return on the portfolio. In order to ensure 
the existence of a unique maximum of Y with respect to Y is asswued 
to be quasi-concave. 
Given these assumptions, a necessary and sufficient condition for 
utility maximization is that X^_^ satisfy: 
(3-26) V«((Fr" ' 
+ 2X® Gov [(surprise, (F^*^ - F^-k^ ^ ''*'t-k ^  ° 
Solving for X^ ^  gives the optimal futures market position: 
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(3-27) 
Y. 4 ( F r  -
„^_rr„t+T „t+T 
;-k 
,t+T „t+T 
•2 Va,[(r^ '- -
X» 
Cov[(surprise, (F^ - ^ t-k^^'^t-k^ 
V„[(FR- C k ' )L\-KL 
The first term of (3-27) indicates that a trader is willing to assume 
additional risk in order to obtain a higher expected return. 
However, a good argument can be made that the first term of equation 
(3-27) will be zero. As shown in equations (3-17) and (3-20), if the 
t+T t^ *X terms and ^ both represent the market's rational expectation of 
spot prices in period t+T, then the term e[(f^^^ - = 0. 
Equation (3-27) can then be written as: 
Gov [surprise, [F^+T - P^-k^l'^t-k^ 
(3-28) , = -x! t K t K 
t-k t „ rr„t+T ^t+T Var[(F=- -
so that : 
^ , CovlsurprUe. 
IVk 
so that the optimal hedge ratio is the risk-minimizing hedge ratio. 
Substituting 3* from equation (3-29) into equation (3-21) yields: 
(3-30) Var(H|4^_^) = (x®)^ Var(surprise|*^_^) 
[Cov[(surprise, F^*^ -
Combining equations (3-22) and (3-30) yields: 
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VarCsurprise | 
(3-31) e = 1 - —7 : 1 . \ 
Var(surprise| 
[Cov [(surprise, I'''t-k^ 
Var[(Ft+^ - Ft*^Jl*t_k]var(surprise|*^_^) 
[Cov [(surprise, F^+T - Pj-k^'^t-k^ 
Var[(F[*^ - |<j)^_^]Var(surprisel^j._^^) 
(3-32) = 
(3-33) e = p2 
2 
where p is the population coefficient of determination between surprises 
and changes in futures prices. 
Both the optimal hedge ratio and the measure of hedging effectiveness 
can be estimated by regression. 
An Operational Model to Evaluate the Hedging Performance of the CD 
Futures Market. 
In order to evaluate the hedging performance of the CD futures 
market, hedges are constructed for three lengths of time: one week, two 
weeks, and thirteen weeks. In all cases, the underlying spot market 
instrument will be a 90-day domestic CD from a large "no-name" bank. The 
hedges are grouped by their beginning dates according to the number of 
months prior to the contract month. For example, two-week hedges begun in 
January for the March futures contract are grouped with two-week hedges 
begun in April for the June contract. Hedges will be constructed using 
the CD futures market as the hedging vehicle. These hedges will be 
compared to hedges constructed with T-bill futures. 
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The coefficients e and 0* will be obtained by estimating difference 
equations constructed for the appropriate hedging lengths. For example, 
the effectiveness of a thirteen-week hedge will be estimated using the 
following equation, 
(3-34) (S^ - E(S^| . a + + W 
(3-35) (S^ - E(S^|+^.j3)1 - a . . « 
where and ^^F are used to distinguish between T-bill and CD futures 
contracts 
The expected future spot rate for the one-week and two-week hedges 
will be approximated by the spot annualized discount rate when the hedge 
is placed. For the 13-week hedge construction, the expected futures spot 
rate will be approximated by the implied forward rate. If the pure 
expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates is correct, 
then the implied forward rate in the yield curve should reflect the 
market's expectations of . 
The results of the study will then be compared to the results of 
Hicks (1980) and Parkinson (1981). Hicks found that cross-hedging CDs 
with T-bill futures is not as effective as traditional T-bill-T-bill 
futures hedges but that cross hedging does provide some protection against 
CD rate fluctuations. In particular, Hicks found that the effectiveness 
of cross hedging CDs with T-bill futures was dramatically lower for hedges 
begun immediately before Treasury refunding announcements. Parkinson 
found little difference between the two types of hedge constructions, but 
his study considered only nearby contracts. Both studies were conducted 
before the introduction of the CD futures market, so they had to speculate 
on what effect such a market would have on hedging against CD rate 
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fluctuations. Hicks foresaw a new futures contract specifying CDs as the 
deliverable instrument as improving prospects for hedging CD interest-rate 
risk for hedges begun within four months of the contract month. For 
hedges begun four months or prior to the contract months, Hicks expected 
to see only modest improvement. Hicks also expected to see improvement in 
hedging effectiveness during months corresponding with Treasury refunding 
announcements. Parkinson was skeptical about the benefits derived from 
the introduction of a CD futures contract. The objective of the present 
study among other things is to see if, in fact, the CD futures market has 
improved prospects for hedging CD interest-rate risk. 
Evaluating Price Discovery Performance 
The second economic function of futures markets is price discovery. 
If the futures price is formed by fully reflecting all available and rele­
vant information, the market is said to be efficient. Efficient markets 
ensure that the market is performing its price discovery function. 
The efficient markets hypothesis maintains that the expected rate of 
return to speculation in the futures market — conditioned on available 
information — is zero. Some authors have noted theoretical problems with 
this proposition since it ignores some intertemporal allocation problems 
and risk considerations. These theoretical arguments indicate that one 
should not equate empirical rejection of this notion of efficiency with 
evidence of market failure. However, this does not remove all interest in 
tests of the hypothesis. The extent to which the CD futures market can be 
characterized as an efficient market remains an interesting question that 
can best be answered through formal econometric analysis. 
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Several market efficiency studies have been conducted using financial 
futures markets in recent years (see Burger, Lang, and Rasche, 1977; 
Capozza and Cornell, 1979; Emery and Scott, 1979; Lang and Rasche, 1978; 
Poole, 1978; Puglisi, 1978; Rendleraan and Carabini, 1979; and Vignola and 
Dale, 1979, 1980). Most of these studies have examined the possibility of 
arbitrage opportunities between the T-bill futures and forward markets. 
These studies are of limited usefulness to the examination of the price 
discovery performance of the CD futures market, because the CD forward 
market is not as well developed as the T-bill forward market. As a 
result, comparisons of futures and relevant CD prices can be made only on 
a few dates each year. Since CD futures have been traded for only 27 
months at the time of this study, an insufficient number of observations 
are available to perform meaningful tests. 
Formally, the efficient markets hypothesis can be expressed as: 
(3-36) = 2(8^+^1 
where F^*^ is the t+T period futures price determined at time t; E is the 
expectations operator in period t; S^^^ is the spot rate in period t+T; 
and <j)|. is the information set available at time t. Equation 3-36 
expresses the notion that if the market is efficient, the futures price 
will be driven to the conditional expectation of the future spot price. 
The efficient markets hypothesis may also be expressed by rewriting 
equation 3-36 to yield the following form: 
(3-37) = 0, 
which is to say that the expected return to speculation is zero. 
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Fama (1970) argued that sufficient conditions for market efficiency 
are that (i) there are no transactions costs in trading the contract; 
(ii) market participants are risk neutral; (iii) market participants form 
their expectations rationally; and (iv) the acquisition of all information 
is costless. However, these conditions are not necessary for market 
efficiency so that rejection of equation 3-36 is not immediately 
translatable into rejection of the efficiency of the CD futures market. 
One alternative to the proposition that market participants are risk 
neutral is that they are instead risk averse. Risk aversion implies that, 
in equilibrium, the futures price equals the conditional expectation of 
the future spot price, plus a risk premium. In this case, futures prices 
would be biased upward. An unsystematic risk premium must be accounted 
2 for in a test of market efficiency. Risk neutrality is not a property 
required for prices to fully reflect available information. 
The assumption that costs of transactions are zero appears to be a 
valid approximation for the CD futures market. Traders on the floor of 
the exchange are exchange members and as such pay commissions on each 
trade. However, these transaction costs are small enough that traders 
rarely hesitate to take advantage of price moves as small as one basis 
point . For the purposes of the study, transactions costs may be assumed 
to be zero. 
2 If the bias was constant or varied in some predictable way, one 
could profit from this information. Since futures and spot prices must 
converge at delivery, other things being equal, one could expect to profit 
by selling futures and repurchasing them shortly before delivery. 
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The CD futures market is competitive in the sense that a trader 
cannot influence the market price by his or her own actions. Although a 
precise measure of competitiveness is not available, the high volume in 
the CD futures nearby confrarts supports the notion that the market is 
competitive. Volume is thinner on the more distant contracts, and it is, 
therefore, conceivable that a large trader could influence these prices. 
The shortcomings of this assumption must be recalled when interpreting 
test results. 
The information set, , can be divided into three subsets. The 
first subset consists of past prices or past rates of return. A test of 
whether the market efficiently utilizes this information is called a test 
of weak form efficiency. The second subset consists of publicly available 
information such as government statistics on relevant variables. A test 
of whether the market efficiently utilizes this kind of information is 
called a semi-strong form test. The third subset of information consists 
of information that is priviledged or available only at significant cost. 
Tests of whether the market efficiently utilizes this kind of information 
are called strong-form tests. 
A testable property of the efficient markets hypothesis is that the 
f t+T t+T^ 
forecast revision, [F^ - is uncorrelated with information 
available at time t-1. A question arises as to which elements of the 
information set, should be used to test this proposition. Although 
any of the elements of could be used, the most recent past forecast 
revisions are likely to generate the most powerful test. 
39 
A direct test of the weak-form efficient markets hypothesis can be 
applied to the CD futures market. A "direct" test uses the actual futures 
prices as opposed to "indirect" tests which compare futures market 
forecasts with those of forecasting models or trading systems. Berger 
(1982) has shown that direct tests reject the null hypothesis of weak-form 
efficient markets more frequently than indirect tests when the alternative 
hypothesis is true, i.e., direct tests are more powerful than indirect 
tests . 
The test that will be used involves estimating regressions of 
forecast revisions on a constant and the two most recent forecast 
revisions. The regression equation may be expressed as: 
(3-38, (rr' - ^ 
The operational null hypothesis of weak form efficient markets in a risk-
neutral world can be expressed as: 
Ho : a = bj = b2 = 0 
To test the joint hypothesis that all coefficients are zero, the F 
statistic will be appropriate. 
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CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this chapter, the main empirical results from the models developed 
in Chapter III are reported. The first section will be devoted to the 
reporting of tests of the anticipatory hedging performance of the CD 
futures market. In the second section, empirical results of market 
efficiency tests will be discussed. 
Empirical Evidence on the Anticipatory Hedging Performance of the 
CD Futures Market 
The CD futures market was established with the expectation that it 
would provide a vehicle for hedging short-term CDs that was more effective 
than T-bill futures. The expectation was that new information concerning 
future spot CD rates would be more fully reflected in the price movements 
of the CD futures market than in the price movements of the T-bill futures 
market. 
Chapter III presented a method for measuring the effectiveness of 
anticipatory hedges constructed with CD futures. In this section, this 
method is applied. Specifically, the effectiveness of hedging anticipated 
positions in the spot CD market with CD futures will be compared to the 
effectiveness of hedges constructed with T-bill futures. 
The data 
The sample period chosen was between July, 1981, the month that CD 
futures began trading, and September, 1983. Futures data were obtained 
from the Wall Street Journal and the International îfonetary Market of the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Daily settlement index prices were gathered 
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for the year preceding the maturity date of each contract and averaged 
into weekly figures. Approximately 52 observations were recorded for each 
of the 11 CD and T-bill futures contracts examined. Holidays were 
omitted. 
Spot CD prices were obtained from the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. These data consist of secondary market offer 
rates on 90- and 180-day top tier CDs. These observations were reported 
in terms of bond equivalent yield.^ The data were transformed to a 
discount basis using the following transformation: 
(4-1) Annualized spot discount rate = — 
To make the spot rate conform to the futures index, the discount spot 
rate was subtracted from 100. 
The 90-day CD forward rates were obtained using the pure expectations 
theory of term structure of interest rates. The implied forward rates 
were derived using the following formula from Stigum (1981): 
sm 
where i = bond equivalent yield 
tg^ = time from settlement to maturity (in days) 
(4-2) Y* = 360 
90 
where Y^gQ = the annualized add-on yield (in decimals) at which a 
180-day (26-week) CD can be bought 
^Bond equivalent yield is based on a 365-day year, whereas the 
discount yield is based on a 360-day year. 
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YgQ - the annualized add-on yield (in decimals) at which a 90-
day (13-week) CD can be bought 
Y* = the implied forward annualized discount rate (in 
decimals) on a 90-day (13-week) CD 90 days from now. 
The data were transformed so that they could be used in equation 
4-3 : 
(4-3) [Sj. - E(S^|4^_^)) = a + G(F^*^ - F^*^) + M 
where all variables are the same as in Chapter III. 
When choosing a proxy for the expected future spot price, there are 
three candidates. The first is the current spot price. As mentioned 
previously, this \fill be a reasonable proxy only when the hedging length 
is short. For the case of a 13-week hedge, the spot rate would not be a 
satisfactory proxy. 
The second candidate is the futures price. After all, the futures 
price is formed on expectations of future spot prices. However, there are 
only four months of the year where the futures price may be used. For 
other than delivery months, the futures price would be a biased estimator 
of future spot prices. For example, one would expect the March futures 
price to provide good insight as to the market's expectation of the future 
spot price in March. However, the March futures price would not be as 
satisfactory a proxy for the market's expectation of spot prices in 
February. 
A third alternative is to use the implied forward price. For 13-week 
hedges on 13-week CDs, the forward price is easy to derive. One dis­
advantage of using the forward price is that daily observations must be 
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aggregated to weekly observations in order to avoid problems with holidays 
and weekends. This aggregation removes some volatility from the price 
series. Also, forward prices can be made to conform with only the 13-week 
hedging period. This is because the 13-week and 26-week spot rate series 
for CDs were the only two series available that could be used to derive 
implied forward prices for 13-week CDs. For example, the price series for 
4-week and 13-week CDs would yield an implied rate for a 9-week CD four 
weeks into the future. This 9-week CD would not conform to the 13-week 
instrument underlying the futures series. Because of this problem, the 
implied forward price was used as a proxy for the expected future spot CD 
price only when 13-week hedges were constructed. 
For hedges constructed for 13 weeks, the implied forward price 
observed in period t-13 is subtracted from the spot price in period t. 
The resulting variable represents the "surprise" the investor encounters 
when the cash position is taken 13 weeks in the future. The term 
) represents the change in the futures price (either CD or T-
bill futures) over the life of the 13-week hedge. 
For hedges constructed for one and two weeks, the spot price in 
period t-k was used as a proxy for the expected spot price in period t. 
Because these hedge periods are so short, this approximation should not be 
unreasonable. In addition, when using these proxies, the results derived 
can be compared with the results derived by Hicks. As with the 13-week 
hedges, for the one- and two-week hedges, the "surprise" is represented by 
subtracting the expected spot price observed in t-k from the spot price in 
t. 
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Once the data are transformed into the appropriate hedging lengths, 
the hedges are grouped by their beginning dates according to the number of 
months prior to the contract months. For example, two-week hedges begun 
in January with the March futures contract are grouped with two-week 
hedges begun in April with the June contract. 
To evaluate the hedging performance of the CD futures market and 
compare it to that of the T-bill futures market, the coefficient of 
2 
determination, R , is used as the test statistic. One problem with this 
statistic is that it has no known distribution. The most that can be said 
2 is that, in general, the higher the R for the various hedge construc­
tions, the more effective the hedge. The null hypothesis is that the 
difference in hedging effectiveness between CD futures and T-bill futures 
will be equal to zero: 
"o -- ° 
»A^ "cD - "î ' ° 
2 2 
where and R^ are measures of hedging effectiveness for hedges 
constructed with CD futures and T-bill futures respectively. 
2 
In general, it is not a good practice to compare one R statistic 
with another unless the dependent variables are the same. This considera­
tion requires that care be taken in analyzing the data. Within each 
hedging length classification, common dependent variables are used so that 
a direct comparison of hedge constructions may be made. For example, a 
13-week CD-CD futures hedge construction (known hereafter as a CD hedge) 
begun three months prior to the contract month will use the same dependent 
variable as a 13-week CD-T-bill futures hedge construction (known here­
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after as a CD cross hedge) also begun three months prior to the contract 
month. 
Regression analysis 
Summary statistics were calculated for various combinations of 
hedging lengths and starting dates for hedges constructed with CD and T-
2 bill futures. The main objectives are to find values for R and 3-
2 
However, the economic interpretation of R and 3 will be valid only as 
long as the assumptions of the standard linear model are met. If these 
assumptions are violated, adjustments must be made. In the particular 
cases studied, the error terms were often serially correlated. Autocor­
relation presents two main problems for evaluating hedging effectiveness. 
2 First, the R statistic will be biased upward. Second, the standard 
errors for the Bs will be biased downward. This means that tests of 
significance will be biased even though the estimated values for the risk-
minimizing hedge ratios will be left unbiased. 
The standard treatment for autocorrelation is to perform a trans­
formation of the original data so that the new error term is independent 
of errors in other periods. However, this method requires that each 
equation be transformed differently so that formerly common dependent 
2 
variables would no longer be common. The R statistics that were 
comparable could then no longer be compared. 
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2 
To avoid this problem, a rebuilt R will be used. This permits a 
generalized least squares (GLS) treatment of the error structure but at 
the same time preserves common dependent variables. The procedure for 
2 deriving the rebuilt R involves two stages. In the first stage, GLS 
estimates of the intercept and slope coefficients are derived. In the 
second stage, the original independent variables are used together with 
the GLS estimates of the coefficients to obtain predicted values of the 
2 
dependent variables. The rebuilt R statistic is defined as: 
" * 9 
«2 \ ' 
rebuilt _ -,2 
where represents the dependent variable [s^ - from 
equation 4.3; represents the predicted value of the dependent variable 
using GLS estimate of the model's parameters; and Y represents the mean of 
the dependent variable. 
Formally, the corrected predicted value of the dependent variable is 
defined as 
Y = a* + b*X 
t t 
where a* and b* are GLS estimates of the parameters of a and 3 in equation 
t "^X t ^*T 
4.3. represents the term (F^ - F^_^) of equation 4.3. 
2 
Using a rebuilt R , GLS transformation will not affect the total sum 
of squares so that models with common dependent variables can still be 
compared. The error sum of squares will of course change, but it is not 
necessary nor desirable that this value be preserved. In fact, the reason 
the data are transformed is to derive an unbiased error sum of squares. 
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A question arises as to the cause of the observed autocorrelation. 
This can be explained by looking at the construction of the dependent 
variable. Consider the following series of observations: 
surprise 
\ 
An important component of the surprise is the forecast of future spot 
rates. In this case, the forecast is made k days in advance, i.e., the 
forecast interval is k days. This construction means that forecasts will 
share information for k-1 days with both the previous day's forecast and 
the next day's forecast. Figure 4.1 shows the overlapping forecast 
intervals for periods t-k and t-k+1. 
common information 
t-k t-k+1 t t+1 
Figure 4.1. Overlapping forecast intervals for forecasts 
of future spot rates. 
Because of these overlapping forecast intervals, one would not expect 
disturbance terras to be independent. The existence of autocorrelation 
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says nothing about the market's hedging or price discovery performance. 
It is reflecting only the construction of the dependent variable. 
GLS estimates of 3 are more efficient than OLS estimates. Summaries 
of both OLS and GLS estimates are presented in Tables 4.1 through 4.4. In 
2 
addition, differences between the rebuilt R statistics for CD and T-bill 
hedge constructions are shown in Table 4.5. Mean squared errors for OLS 
and GLS regression equations are shown in Appendix B. 
From these tables, it can be seen that CD futures provide a better 
vehicle for hedging anticipated cash CD positions than do T-bill futures. 
2 
In virtually every case, the R statistics for CD hedges are greater than 
those for CD cross hedges. Moreover, this difference is often quite 
large . 
In general, the shorter the length of the hedge, the less effective 
the CD hedge and CD cross hedge. This difference is especially pronounced 
between the short-term (one- or two-week) hedges and the 13-week hedges. 
This result is consistent with previous hedging studies. 
Based on Ederington's study, one would expect hedging effectiveness 
to decline monotonically the further from the contract month. These 
results do not indicate such a dependable decline for either CD hedges or 
CD cross hedges. In fact, effectiveness measures for all hedging lengths 
suggest that hedges begun in some periods are worse than hedges begun one 
month earlier or later. Specifically, hedges begun two, five, eight, and 
eleven months prior to the month the contract matures are relatively less 
effective than hedges begun one month earlier or later. This is true for 
both CD hedges and CD cross hedges. The beginning dates for these hedges 
fall in the months of January, April, July, and October. Before the 
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Table 4.1. The Effectiveness of Hedging Anticipated Spot CD Positions 
(one-, two-, and thirteen-week hedges), "e" or from 
ordinary least squares estimates of equation 4-3^ 
Number of Months Treasury-Bill Futures CD Futures 
Prior to Contract one- two- 13-week 13-week one- two- 13-week 13-week 
Month week week (forward) (spot) week week (forward) (spot) 
1 .76 .78 - — .81 .82 — -
2 .63 .70 - - .70 .74 - -
3 .55 .51 .88 .87 .71 .68 .99 .90 
4 .62 .71 .92 .81 .74 .78 .96 .84 
5 .61 .67 .78 .70 .62 .65 .84 .76 
6 .59 .54 .93 .81 .75 .73 .93 .79 
7 .59 .62 .86 .69 .62 . 66 .89 .73 
8 .57 .62 .70 .61 .61 .62 .75 .65 
9 .57 .52 .86 .71 .76 .75 .87 .72 
10 .61 .60 .83 .63 .64 .65 .85 . 68 
11 .52 .50 .74 .68 .56 .51 .75 .67 
^High "e" or value means the hedge is effective. 
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Table 4.2. Ordinary Least Squares estimates of g*, the risk-
minimizing hedge ratio. 
Number of Months Treasury-Bill Futures CD Futures 
Prior to Contract one- two- 13-week 13-week one- two- 13-week 13-week 
Month week week (forward) (spot) week week (forward) (spot) 
1 .90 .82 - - .84 .76 - -
2 .84 .99 - - .71 .83 - -
3 .58 .56 1.03 1.03 .60 .60 .93 .89 
4 .92 .88 1.02 1.00 .86 .79 .90 .88 
5 .88 1.05 .91 .91 .70 .81 .89 .89 
6 .64 .62 1.24 1.14 .66 .67 .99 .91 
7 1.02 .93 1.10 1.04 .89 .80 .96 .91 
8 .94 1.12 .97 .95 .76 .89 .95 .93 
9 .72 .70 1.40 1.25 .75 .76 1.12 1.00 
10 1.13 1.02 1.23 1.12 o
 
o
 
.88 1.07 .99 
11 .89 1.13 1.00 .94 .80 .95 .96 .89 
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Table 4.3. The Effectiveness of Hedging Anticipated Spot CD Positions 
(one-, two-, and thirteen-week hedges), using "rebuilt" R to 
correct for autocorrelation 
Number of Months Treasury-Bill Futures CD Futures 
Prior to Contract one- two- 13-week 13-week one- two- 13—week 13-week 
Month week week (forward) (spot) week week (forward) (spot) 
1 .76 .78 — — .81 .82 — — 
2 .62 .69 - - .69 .73 - -
3 .55 .49 .88 .86 .71 .68 .99 .89 
4 .62 .70 .92 .81 .74 .78 .96 .84 
5 .60 .65 .77 .67 .62 .63 .84 .73 
6 .59 .51 .93 .79 .75 .73 .91 .76 
7 .45 .62 .85 .69 .62 . 66 .88 .72 
8 .58 .61 .70 .58 .60 .60 .74 .61 
9 .56 .48 .85 .67 .75 .75 .87 .70 
10 .61 .60 .83 .63 .64 .64 .85 ,67 
11 .49 .50 .73 .66 .56 .51 .74 .56 
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Table 4.4. Generalized Least Squares estimates of g, the risk-
minimizing hedge ratio 
Number of Months Treasury-Bill Futures CD Futures 
Prior to Contract one- two- 13-week 13-week one- two- 13-week 13-week 
Month week week (forward) (spot) week week (forward) (spot) 
1 .90 .89 — — .84 .82 — -
2 .75 .85 - - .64 .70 - -
3 .61 .66 1.01 1.11 .65 .64 .93 .96 
4 .92 .92 1.00 .98 .86 .82 .87 .83 
5 .79 .88 .84 .71 .64 .68 .82 .72 
6 .64 .77 1.26 1.33 .73 .70 1.12 1.06 
7 1.02 .98 1.05 .97 .89 .83 .89 .82 
8 .85 .96 .95 .79 .70 .75 .87 .73 
9 .82 .88 1.54 1.55 .82 .79 1.23 1.19 
10 1.13 1.09 1.20 1.10 1.00 .98 1.01 .94 
11 .77 1.10 .92 .79 .77 .97 .89 .77 
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Table 4.5. Differences in Hedging Effectiveness, Rgp - (Rebuilt R 
Statistics) 
Months prior to Hedging Length 13-weeks 13 weeks 
contract month 1 week 2 weeks (implied rate) (spot) 
1 .05 .05 
2 .07 .04 
3 .16 .19 .11 .03 
4 .12 .08 .04 .03 
5 .02 -.02 .07 .06 
6 .16 .22 -.02 -.03 
7 .03 .04 .03 .03 
8 .02 -.01 .04 .03 
9 .19 .27 .02 .03 
10 .03 .04 .02 .04 
11 .07 .01 .01 .00 
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introduction of the CD futures contract in 1981, Hicks had observed this 
quarterly decline in the effectiveness of CD cross hedges. 
A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that these are the 
months the Treasury's quarterly refunding announcements are made. One 
would expect that announcements on the number of Treasury bills to be 
auctioned to affect the T-bill futures market more than the CD futures 
market. This is new information that would change expectations of future 
T-bill spot prices more than it would change expectations of future CD 
spot prices because this information is more specific to the one market 
than the other. If this hypothesis is true, one would expect to see 
substantial improvement in hedging effectiveness during these months with 
CD-CD futures hedge constructions. The results, however, do not lend 
strong support to this hypothesis. Table 4.5 shows that improvement in 
hedging effectiveness is not substantially greater for hedges begun during 
Treasury refunding months than for hedges begun in other months. Hedging 
effectiveness declines for both CD cross hedges and CD hedges during the 
months of January, April, July and October. 
For the shorter-term hedging lengths, there also are exceptions to 
the rule of declining hedging effectiveness the further from contract 
maturity. Cross hedges begun three, six and nine months prior to contract 
maturity are less effective than hedges begun a month earlier or later. 
As a result, the difference in hedging effective becomes especially 
pronounced during these months. The beginning dates for these hedges fall 
in the months of March, June, September and December. 
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It is interesting to note that these quarterly declines in hedging 
effectiveness occurs only in short-term CD cross hedges and not in any CD-
CD futures hedges. A separate test shows that the correlation between 90-
day spot T-bills and T-bill futures also declines during these months. 
These observations suggest that the cause of the decline in hedging 
effectiveness is isolated in the T-bill futures market. One can only 
speculate that short-term technical factors, such as offsetting short 
positions, have increased significance during delivery months causing 
futures prices to move independently of the hedger's information set. 
Why the CD futures market is spared from this experience remains a 
mystery. 
Using the implied forward price in place of the spot price in 13-week 
hedge constructions amplifies the difference in effectiveness between CD 
hedges and CD cross hedges. As can be seen from Table 4.5, when the 
implied rate is used, the difference in effectiveness between CD hedges 
and CD cross hedges becomes greater than the difference when only the spot 
late is used. This increase in relative hedging effectiveness is 
especially pronounced for hedges started close to delivery. For example, 
for 13-week hedges begun 3 months prior to contract maturity, the 
difference in relative hedging effectiveness increases from .03 to .11 
when the implied forward rate is used. 
2 
Using the implied forward price causes the rebuilt R statistics to 
increase significantly for both CD hedges and cross hedges. Not only is 
the measure of hedging effectiveness altered significantly, but the risk-
minimizing hedge ratios are also affected. These results suggest serious 
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shortcomings in the practice of using the spot price as a proxy for 
expected future spot prices. 
Tables 4.2 and 4.4 show the risk-minimizing hedge ratios for the 
various hedge constructions. For anticipatory hedges, these coefficients 
should be interpreted as the number of futures contracts that must be sold 
and later repurchased to provide an optimal hedge for an anticipated spot 
2 
CD position of 1 million dollars. In general, for a given R , the higher 
the values for 6, the less effective the hedge. A hedge construction with 
a high 3 relative to the 3s of other hedge constructions means that more 
contracts must be used to achieve a certain level of protection. Or, in 
other words, a high 3 means it's costly to achieve a given level of 
protection. Tables 4.2 and 4.4 show that in virtually every case, CD 
hedges have lower 3s than do CD cross hedges. 
An alternative, non-regression, method for finding the optimal hedge 
ratio has been proposed by Starleaf and Langley (1983). With this method, 
a complete hedge is defined to be one where the expected net gain or loss 
from hedging is zero: 
where n* is the number of contracts shorted and later repurchased or 
bought and later sold. 
Given this definition, a value for n* can be found that will on 
average yield a complete hedge: 
(4-4) net gain or loss = 0 = (s^ - n* 
(4-5) n* = 
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Instead of minimizing the sum of squared error terras as in 
regression, with this method the objective function is solved directly. 
With this method the calculations of the expected values requires special 
care so that positive and negative values do not cancel each other. To 
avoid this problem, absolute values are used except when the numerator and 
denominator move in opposite directions. In these cases, absolute 
differences between "surprises" and futures changes are used as an 
approximation. As one can see from equation 4-4, these calculation 
adjustments are consistent with the objective of the hedger. 
Values for n* were computed for each hedge construction, and the 
results are presented in Table 4.6. These results often differ from OLS 
and GLS estimates of the risk-minimizing hedge ratio. The most striking 
difference occurs for hedges begun 2, 5, 8, and 11 months prior to 
delivery. In every case during these months, n* is greater than 
These months are when Treasury refunding announcements are made. 
During these months, futures and spot prices often move in opposite 
directions. Regression estimates of the optimal hedge ratio may penalize 
opposite price moves too much and yield misleading results. 
Empirical Evidence on the Price Discovery Performance of the 
CD Futures Market 
In this section, the main empirical results of the efficiency tests 
are reported. The analysis is done using daily observations for CD 
futures prices. The sample period is again between July, 1981, and 
September, 1983. The data are arranged, as in the previous section, so 
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Table 4.6. Optimal number of contracts, H* hedge ratio. 
Number of Months Treasury-Bill Futures CD Futures 
Prior to Contract one- two- 13-week 13-week one- two- 13-week 13-week 
Month week week (forward) (spot) week week (forward) (spot) 
1 .90 .81 - - .77 .79 — — 
2 .86 1.07 - - .74 .85 - -
3 .71 .72 1.03 .96 .67 .67 .84 .78 
4 .90 .87 1.03 1.02 .80 .77 .87 . 86 
5 .94 1.16 1.02 1.07 .78 .93 .94 .96 
6 .77 .74 1.17 1.15 .70 .66 1.03 .96 
7 1.06 .96 1.14 1.12 .91 .86 .99 .97 
8 .91 1.30 1.10 1.14 .86 1.06 1 .12 1 .13 
9 .89 .83 1.44 1.32 .80 .77 1, .19 1 .10 
.0 1.10 1.04 1.34 1.30 .98 .92 1 .16 1 .13 
.1 1.10 1.46 1.06 1.05 .97 1.16 1, 04 1 .07 
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that separate regression tests of market efficiency are performed for 
observations on nearby and distant contracts. 
Regression analysis 
The efficient markets hypothesis states that all currently available 
and relevant information about current and future events will be reflected 
in current market prices. Thus, as new information about future events 
becomes available, expectations of future prices will change, causing 
changes in current prices. If new information comes to the market in the 
form of a random series of events, and if market prices change quickly 
according to revised expectations, then today's forecast revision should 
be uncorrelated to previous forecast revisions. 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 give the results of ordinary least squares 
regression estimates of equation 3-38. 
(3-38) - F^!^) = a . 
The hypothesis that implies that today's forecast 
t*4*T ^ 
revision, - F^_^, is uncorrelated with information available at time 
4. I 'T^  f* «4» T 
t-1. These regressions test the hypothesis that F^ ~ 1 orthogonal 
to 
In general, the results are consistent with the efficient markets 
hypothesis. However, the joint test of the null hypothesis that a 
a=bj^ = b2=0is rejected in periods 5 and 11 at a 5 percent 
significance level. The hypothesis that a = b^ = 0 is rejected in periods 
2, 5, 8, and 11, also at the 5 percent level. The failure to accept these 
null hypotheses is due to the marginal significance of the intercept term. 
Table 4.7. Regression estimation of 
Number of 
Months Prior 
to Contract 
Month a 
1 .031 
(1.392) 
2 .047* 
(2.120) 
3 -.005 
(-.255) 
4 .014 
(.668) 
5 .037 
(1.964) 
6 -.004 
(-.251) 
7 .009 
( .491) 
8 .034 
(1.89) 
9 .003 
(-.218) 
h ^2 
- .001  .144  
( - .012)  (1 .843)  
.037  .020  
( .435)  ( .230)  
.059  .074  
( .777)  ( .979)  
- .036  .173*  
( - .456)  (2 .172)  
.116  .062  
(1 .376)  ( .728)  
.082  .064  
(1 .097)  ( .860)  
- .072  .159  
( - .893)  (1 .949)  
.057  .099  
( .684)  (1 .181)  
.077  .048  
(1 .020)  ( .647)  
pi pZ 
(bi=b2=0) (a=bj^=b2=0) 
1.699 2.259 .020 
.124 1.854 .001 
.800 .592 .030 
2.478 1.97 .030 
1.343 2.84* .019 
1.028 .753 .012 
2.433 1.78 .030 
.980 2.1,5 .014 
.763 .563 .009 
10 .008 -. 086 .172 .036 
(.422) (-1.015) (1.983)* 
11 .036 1.193 .021 1.742 
(1.866) (1.806) ( .204) 
12 -.004 -.0954 .031 .892 
(-.211) (-1.226) (.407) 
1.93 
2.992* 
.605 
.036 
.037 
.011  
Table 4.8. Regression estimation of 
Number of 
Months Prior 
to Contract F 
Month a bj bj^=0 a=bj^=0 
1  .039  
(  .075)3  
.001  
(  .986)  
.000  1 .664  .000  
2  .048*  
(2 .19)  
.038  
( .444)  
.197  2 .773*  .001  
3  - .006  
( - .347)  
,061  
(  .801)  
.642  .408  .004  
4  .021  
(1 .019)  
- .038  
( - .483)  
.233  .579  .002  
5  .039*  
(2 .097)  
.124  
(1 .471)  
2 .164  4 .0155*  .015  
6  - .006  
( - .341)  
.086  
(1 .148)  
1 .317  .761  .008  
7  .015  
( .813)  
- .083  
( -1 .024)  
1 .048  .760  .007  
8  .037*  
(2 .084)  
.062  
( .751)  
.564  2 .824  .004  
9  - .004  
(0 .290)  
.079  
(1 .054)  
1 .110  .637  .006  
10 .014 -.103 
(.780) (-1.202) 
11 .036* .196 
(1.923) (1.865) 
12 -.004 -.098 
(-.224) (-1.275) 
statistics in parentheses. 
*significant at 5 percent level. 
1.444 .908 .010 
3.479 4.515* .037 
1.627 .828 .010 
<T> 
W 
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as in every case the hypotheses that = bg = 0 is not rejected. 
These results imply the possibility of a systematic disturbance in 
the CD futures market occurring during the months of January, April, July, 
and October. As mentioned before, these months correspond with the 
Treasury's quarterly refunding announcements. The null hypothesis in both 
cases is accepted at a 1 percent significance level. 
The results also suggest that there is no difference in efficiency 
between nearby and distant contracts. The results are nearly the same no 
matter the time distance between the observation and the delivery month. 
One might not have expected these results since distant contracts are so 
much thinner than nearby contracts. One might have expected that the 
arrival of new information would not be rapidly incorporated into distant 
contract prices because of a possible lack of competition. Although the 
distant contracts are thin, they are apparently competitive enough that 
their price discovery performance is adequate. 
In sum, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the CD 
futures market is adequately performing its price discovery function. The 
CD futures price appears to be formed by a fairly rapid reflection of new 
information about future events. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study was initiated to examine the hedging and price discovery 
performance of the CD futures market. Ordinarily, futures markets 
adequately perform these functions, resulting in the generation of 
economic benefits. A futures contract is denied approval by the CFTC only 
if it can be demonstrated that the market would not perform these func­
tions. If the premise that financial futures are adequately performing 
their hedging and price discovery functions is to serve as the basis for 
CFTC policy toward these markets, then it should be supported by a solid 
body of empirical evidence. This study of the CD futures market should, 
therefore, be relevant to the needs of policy makers. 
Hedging Performance 
Before July 1981, CD futures contracts were not traded so that banks 
often used other futures contracts — usually Treasury-bill futures 
contracts — as hedging instruments. A study by Hicks (1980) suggested 
that the effectiveness of hedging anticipated CD positions could be 
improved with the development of a CD futures contract. Market studies by 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade and the 
New York Futures Exchange showed that banks (and others) would use such a 
contract if it existed. As a result of these studies, the CFTC granted 
approval of CD futures contracts on these exchanges in the spring of 1981. 
The expectation of all parties was that the CD futures contract would 
provide a vehicle for hedging short-term CDs that was more effective than 
Treasury-bill futures. 
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Hedging effectiveness should be evaluated in comparison to the 
objective of the hedger. With CD futures, the objective of the hedger 
will most often be to avoid the consequences of unwelcome surprises. The 
surprise will be the difference between future spot CD prices and expected 
spot CD prices. 
In this study, the model employed to evaluate hedging performance 
provides estimates of the correlation between spot market surprises and 
changes in futures prices. If the correlation is high, one may conclude 
that the futures market is useful in offsetting the consequences of 
unanticipated changes in interest rates. 
The model was used to generate measures of the effectiveness of 
hedging short-term CDs with CD futures. These measures were then compared 
to the measures generated for CD hedges constructed with T-bill futures. 
The results of this study demonstrate that the CD futures market is 
adequately performing its hedging function. For those who anticipate 
positions in the spot CD market, the CD futures market almost always out­
performed the T-bill futures market as a hedging vehicle for avoiding the 
consequences of unwelcome surprises. The difference in hedging perform­
ance is especially pronounced for hedges begun during delivery months. 
The results also indicate that the choice of a proxy for the expected 
future spot rate can be important in evaluating hedging performance. 
Previous hedging studies have used the current spot rate as a proxy for 
future spot rates. For hedging lengths of one or two weeks, this may not 
be an unreasonable assumption, but for longer-term hedges, this assumption 
becomes less reasonable. These result shows that when the implied forward 
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rate is used as a proxy for the expected spot rate, hedging effectiveness 
measures are improved significantly. 
Before the introduction of CD futures, Hicks (1980) had observed a 
quarterly decline in the effectiveness of CD-T-bill futures hedge 
constructions. These declines correspond with the Treasury's quarterly 
refunding announcements. This observation led some to suggest that the 
introduction of CD futures would improve hedging performance during these 
months. The reasoning behind this hypothesis was that Treasury refunding 
announcements would change expectations of future T-bill spot prices more 
than they would change expectations of future CD spot prices because this 
information is more specific to the one market than the other. 
If the hypothesis is true, one would expect to see substantial 
improvement in hedging effectiveness during these months with CD-CD 
futures hedge constructions. The results, however, do not lend strong 
support to this hypothesis. Hedging effectiveness declines quarterly for 
CD-CD futures hedge constructions also, leaving the overall improvement in 
hedging effectiveness about the same as for hedges begun in other months. 
These results do, however, confirm the conventional wisdom that 
"traditional" hedges outperform cross hedges. The difference in hedging 
effectiveness between these tvro types of hedge constructions can be 
accounted for by differences in the instruments underlying each futures 
contract. Although T-bills and CDs are similar in many respects, they 
differ in some important ways. One represents public debt, the other 
private; one has no default risk, the other does. The underlying 
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instruments are different enough that the futures prices for each will be 
responding to different information sets. 
Price Discovery Performance 
The second economic function of a futures market is price discovery. 
If the futures price is formed by fully reflecting all available informa­
tion, the market is said to be efficient. Efficient markets ensure that 
the market is performing its price discovery function. 
Using a test procedure similar to one used by Hansen and Hodrick 
(1980), a direct test of the weak-form efficient markets hypothesis can be 
applied to the CD futures market. A "direct" test uses the actual futures 
prices as opposed to "indirect" tests which compare futures market 
forecasts with those of forecasting models or trading systems. Berger 
(1982) has shown that direct tests reject the null hypothesis more 
frequently than indirect tests when the alternative hypothesis is true, 
i.e., direct tests are more powerful than indirect tests. 
The test used in this study involves estimating regressions of 
forecast revisions on a constant and the two most recent forecast 
revisions. The equation may be expressed as: 
(5.1) (F« - * '2(^2 - CP ^  
The operational null hypothesis of weak-form efficient markets in a risk-
neutral world can be expressed as: 
HQ: a = b} = b2 = 0 
To test the joint hypothesis that all coefficients are zero, the F-
statistics will be appropriate. 
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Results of these tests of the weak-form efficient markets hypothesis 
indicate that new information is quickly incorporated into market prices. 
Current forecast revisions are uncorrelated with recent forecast 
revisions. This is the result one would expect if the market is efficient 
and new information comes to the market as a random series of events. A 
surprising result was uncovered in that forecast revisions appeared to 
differ systematically during the months of January, April, July and 
October. These months correspond with the Treasury's quarterly refunding 
announcements. The deviations from the efficient markets hypothesis were, 
however, small. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
CD futures market is adequately performing its price discovery function. 
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APPENDIX A. SPECIFICATIONS OF CD AND T-BILL FUTURES CONTRACTS 
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SPECIFICATIONS FOR THREE-MONTH DOMESTIC CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT FUTURES CONTRACTS 
TRADED ON THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY MARKET 
SCOPE OF CHAPTER—This chapter is limited In application lo contract specifications ol Three-Month Domestic 
Corlillcales ol Deposit futures which are open for trading and delivery on I he International Monetary Market. • 
Division o) Ihe Chicago Me/canlile Exchange. The procedures loi trading, clearing, delivery, sellleirienl and any 
other mailers not specifically contained herein shall be governed by the rules ol Ihe Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
COMMODITY SPECIFICATIONS—Each futures contract shall be for a Domestic Certificate ol Deposit having a 
principal value of S 1.000.000 with a three month maturity. 
TRADING MONTHS — March, Juno. September, December 
TICKER SYMBOL—DC 
TRADING HOURS —8:00 a.m. lo 2:00 p.m. 
PRICE INCREMENTS — Bids and offers shall be quoted in terms ol the I.M.M. Index, 100.00 minus yield on an 
annual basis lor a 360-day year. (A deposit rale ol 7.20% shall be quoted as 92.80.) Minimum fluctuations ol lha 
I.M.M. Index shall be in multiples of .01 ($25.00). 
NORMAL DAILY PRICE LIMITS—There shall be no trading at a level mora than 0.80 (80 basis points) I.M.M. Index 
points above or below Ihe preceding day's settlement price except when the expanded daily price limit schedule 
goes into etlect and on Ihe last day ol trading when there shall be no limit. 
EXPANDED DAILY PRICE LIMITS—Whenever on two successive days any contract monlh settles at the normal 
daily limit In the same direction (not necessarily the same contract monlh on both days) an expanded daily limit 
schedule shall go Into ellect as loi lows: 
1. The third day's daily limit in all contract months shall be 150% ol the normal daily limit. 
2. If any contract monlh selffos at its expanded daify limit on Ihe third day in Ifte samo direction, Ihon Ihe loudh day's 
expanded daily llmil and each successive day therealter, shall be 200% ol Ihe normal daily limit, so long as any 
contract month settles at its expanded daily llmil. 
3. Whenever Ihe loregoing dally limit schedule Is in ellect and no contract month settles at the limit in Ih i same 
direction which initiated or maintained Ihe expanded schedulp, then the normal daily limit shall bo leinstalcd on the 
lollowing day. 
SETTLEMENT PRICE—The Settlement Price may be outside ol the day's High/Low range, and/or may be different 
from the midpoint of the Closing Range, per C.M.E. Rule 813. 
TERMINATION OF FUTURES TRADING — Futures trading sliall terminate on the business day Immediately 
preceding the last delivery day ol the contract monlh. 
DELIVERY DAYS — De'ivery shall bo made on any business day that is not a bank holiday in either Now York or 
Chicago, and in the period beginning on the 15th day ol the contract monlh, and ending on Ihe last business day ol 
Ihe contract month. 
APPROVED DELIVERY BANKS—On the second business day preceding tlia 15th calendar day s! each month, 
the I.M.M. stall will update a list ol Domestic Ceilillcales ot Deposit accepted as good delivery. This list viriH be 
composed ol those Domestic Corlillcales ol Deposit that are consklnrod by the cash market to be ol the tiighest 
liquidity, lowest credit risk and which trade at klentical yields. Tim list will be termed by selecting a random sample of 
at least 7 dealers from a list of at least 10 dealers who actively participate in Ihe Domestic Ceililicate ol Deposit 
market. The bank names that are common lo at least five lists in tlie sample and have agreed lo be deliverable on the 
contract will comprise the list ol deliverable Domestic Ceitlticalu ot Ouposit issues. 
DELIVERABLE ISSUES—Any Domestic Cerlificato of Deposit meeting the following conditions shall constitute a 
deliverable CD. 
t. having a fixed maturity value' not loss than $1.000.000 and not greater than $1,200.000, 
2. having no interost payments between the delivery dato and maturity date, 
3. maturity not before tlw 16th ol Ihe month three months alter tho spot monlh nor alter the last day ol the month 
three months aller the spot month, 
4. matuiing on a business day thai is not a banking holiday in either New Yoik or Chicago: and 
5. having no more than 185 days accrued intorosl payable at rnatuiity. 
'Malufily value on discount Dwnustic Cuililicatos ol Depoul rrwaiis iMincipdl v.iluo Maliiniy vatui on add-oti Oom##lic C«f1ihcatit ot 
Oopu»l rnoans pnncipat plus inloiesi piivot>(o #t maiunly 
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SELLER'S DUTIES—The clearing member representing a customer making delivery In liquidation ol his position, 
shall presenl to the Clearing House by 2:00 p m.. one business day belore delivery day. a Seller's Delivery 
CommilmenI completed in lull. II such commltmenl is received later than 2:00 p.m. on the business day prior to the 
last delivery bul no) later than 9:00 a.m. on the las! delivery day, seller's clearing member shall be assessed a fine on 
a per contract basis, the amount to be determined by the Board. Any papers received subsequent to 9:00 a.m. on Ihe 
last delivery day shall conslilule Ihe seller's lailure to perform and be acted upon in accordance wilh Rule 3806. 
Belofe 12:00 noon (Chicago lime) on the delivery date. Seller's Clearing Member shall deliver a Domestic Certilicate 
of Deposit ol an Approved Delivery Bank, satisfying the conditions o! Rule 3803 D. to a New York City bank 
registered wi!h the Exchange and a membei ol Ihe Federal Reserve System selected by Ihe buyer. 
BUYER'S DUTIES —Upon nolilicalion of delivery by Ihe Clearing House, the clearing member representing the 
buyer shall deliver to Ihe Clearing House by 5:00 p.m. (Chicago time) on the day before the delivery date, a Buyer's 
Delivery Commlirnnnt that includes: the buyer's name and account numtier. and the name of a f^ew York City bank 
registered with Ihe Exchange and a member ol the Federal Reserve System to which the delivery unit should be 
transferred. The clearing member representing the buyer shall, by 12:45 p.m. (Chicago time) by payment against 
delivery on Ihe day'of delivery, presenl lo Ihe seller's clearing member's b^k or its designated agent a wi^e transfer 
ol Federal funds lor the net invoicing price. 
PAR DELIVER Y—A delivery unit shall be a Domestic Certilicate of Deposit of an approved delivery bank satisfying 
Ihe conditions ol 3603-D. 
The following formula shall be used to calculate the net invoicing price: 
(maturity value') ^ (1 + (F yield") days to maturity) 
360 
* Malufity valuo on<kscounl Domostic CwWicalos ol OopostI means principal value. Malurily value on add-on DomAsiic Corljficalesof 
Depoal moans pnndpsl plus inleiosi payabia ai malixity. 
"Tha F yield is Iha dilleience botwoen 100.00 and Ihe IM M Index al selllomeni on ilw day beloie dolhnxy day. expressod in decimal» 
F yield = (100.00 * F index) x 001. 
DELIVERY POINTS—Delivery shall be made to a New York City bank, registered with Ihe Exchange and a member 
of the Federal Reserve System, specilied by the buyer's ctearing member. All banks selected by the buyer and by Ihe 
seller to effectuate delivery must tie members ol the Federal Reserve System. 
DISCRETIONARY POSITION LIMITS—The Board may in its sole and complete discretion Impose limits upon an 
individual or upon related accounts. 
CONTRACT MODIFICATION—Specilicatlons shall be fixed asol the lirst day ol trading ol a contract except lhal all 
deliveries must conform to government regulations in force al the lime ol delivery. H any U.S. governmental agency 
or txxly issues an order, ruling, directive or law peilaining to the trading or delivery of Domeslic Certificates of 
Deposit, such order, mling. directive or law shall be construed lo lake precedence and become part of these rules, 
and all open and new contracts shall be subject to such government orders. 
EMERGENCIES, ACTS OF GOD, ACTS OF GOVERNMENT—If delivery or acceptance or any precondition or 
requirement ol either is prevented by strike, fire, accident, action of government or act of God, Uie seller or buyer 
shall immediately notity Ihe Exchange President. II the Prosidenl determines that emergency action may be 
necessary, he shall call a special meeting ol the Board of Governors arx) arrange lor the presentation ol evidence 
respecting the emergency condition II Ihe Board determines lhal an emergency exists, ft shall lake such action as it 
deems necussary under ihe circumstances and its decision shall bo t>inding upon all parties lo Ihe contract For 
example, and without limiting the Board's power, it may: lake action in accordance with Rule 3806: extend delivery '• 
dales: and designate allornala approved banks in Ihe event of conditions interfering wilh Ihe normal operations of 
approved facilities. 
fn the event lhal Ihe Board ol Governors or Business Conduct CommHIee determines lhal there exists a shortage ol 
deliverable Domestic Certificates ol Deposit, it may upon a Iwo thirds vole of the members present or upon a 
two-thirds vole ol the members who respond lo a poll take such action as may in Ihe Board's or Committee's sole 
discretion appear necessary lo prevent, correct, or alleviate Ihe condition. Without limiting Ihe foregoing. Ihe Board 
or Conimllteo may: (I) designate as deliverable Certileates ol Deposit of banks not on the Approved Bank List and 
(2) determine a cash settlement based on the current cash value ol a 3-month Certificate of Deposit as determined 
by using Ihe current cash market yield curve on Ihe last day of trading. 
FAILURE TO PERFORM — II the clearing member wilh a delivery commitment laits to perlorm all acts required by 
lliis chapter, then lhal clearing member shall bo deemed as failing to perform which may be punishable as a major 
violation. A clearing member falling lo perform shall bo liable to tlie clearing member to which it was matched on tha 
tailing transaction loi any loss sustained, taking into account tlie settlement price, interest earnings foregone, and 
such other factors as it deems appropriate. The Boaid may also assess sucit penalliss as It deems appropriate in 
addition lo damages 
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SPECIFICATIONS FOR U.S. 90-DAY TREASURY BILL FUTURES CONTRACTS 
TRADED ON THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY MARKET 
SCOPE OF CHAPTER—This chapter is limited in application to contract specilications of U.S. 
Treasury Bill (utures which are open lor trading and delivery on the International Monetary Market, a 
Division ol the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The procedure lor trading, clearing, delivery, seulement 
and any other matters nol specifically contained herein shall be governed by the rules of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange. 
COMMODITY SPECIFICTIONS—Each futures contract shall be for 3-month (13 week) U.S. Trea­
sury bills having a lace value at maturity ol SI ,000,000. 
TRADING MONTHS—March, June, September, December. Effective July 2,1980, a new quarterly 
cycle consisting ol January, April, July and October was listed lor trading as "regular" contracts 
months in addition to the quarterly cycle ol March, June, September and December. 
TICKER SYMBOL—TB 
TRADING HOURS—8:00 a.m. - 2:00 p.m. 
PRICE INCREMENTS—Prices shall be quoted in terms of the I.M M. index. (Example: A T-bill yield ol 
5.20 shall be quoted as 94.80) 
The I.M M. index is Ihe difference between the actual T-bill yield and 100.00. 
A T-bill yield, or bank discount rale, is the difference between Ihe face value of a bill and its market 
value on an annualized basis. 
Minimum price fluctuations of the I.M M. index shall be in multiples ol .01 ($25.00) The minimum 
fluctuation is equal to one basis point. 
DAILY PRICE RANGE—There shall be no trading at a price more than .60 (60 basis points) above or 
below the preceding day's settlement price except when Ihe expanded daily price limit schedule goes 
into effect, and on the last day ol trading when there shall be no limit. 
EXPANDED DAILY PRICE LIMITS—Whenever on two successive days any contract month settles 
at the normal daily price limit in the same direction (not necessarily Ihe same contract month un both 
days) an expanded daily price limit schedule shall go into ellect as follows: 
I The third day's daily price limit in all contract months shall be 150% of the normal daily price limit. 
2. II any contract month settles at its expanded daily pricc limit on the third day in Ihe same direction, 
then the fourth day's expanded daily price limit and each successive day therealter, shall be 200% 
ol the normal daily price limit, so long as any contract month settles at its expanded daily price limit. 
3. Whenever the loregoing duily price limil schedule Is In ullect and no conlract month settles at the 
price limit in the same direction which initialed or maintained the expanded schedule, then Ihe 
normal daily price limil shall be reinstated on Ihe following day. 
SETTLEMENT PRICE—Ellective March 27,1981 : The Settlement Price may be outside ol the day's 
High/Low range, and/or may be dillerent from the midpoint of the Closing Range, per C.M.E. Rule 813. 
TERMINATION OF FUTURES TRADING—Futures trading shall terminate on Ihe second business 
day lollowing the Federal Reserve 3-month (13-week) Treasury-bill auction ol the third week of the 
delivery month. In the event that no auction is conducted, trading shall terminale on Ihe third 
Wednesday ol Ihe conlract month, unless lhal day is an Exchange holiday. In such instance, trading 
shall terminate on the next business day. For purposes ol Ihe rule, the "third week ol the delivery 
month" shall mean the week commencing on the third fulonday of the delivery month. Ellective with the 
December 1980 Futures Contract futures trading in tlie spot month shall terminate on the business 
day immediately preceding the lirst delivery day. 
PAR DELIVERY—A delivery unit shall be composed ol a United Stales Treasury bill(s) maturing 90 
days hence (ellective December 1980 Futures Contract: maturing 90 days from the lirst delivery day) 
with a lace value of $1,000,000 at matunly. 
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DELIVERY POINTS—Delivery shall be made to a Chicago (elleclive March 1981 Fulures Contract: or 
New York) bank, registered with the Exchange and a member ol the Federal Reserve System, 
specilied by the buyer's clearing member. All banks selected by the buyer and by the seller to 
eHecluate delivery must be members ol the Federal Reserve System. 
DELIVERY DAYS—Delivery shall be made on (he business day following the last day ol trading, 
unless that day is an Exchange or Illinois bank holiday, in which case delivery shall be on the next 
business day common to the Exchange and Illinois banks. Elleclive with the December 1980 Fulures 
Contract; Delivery shall be made on the Ihree business days beginning with the day ol issue ol 
13-week Treasury bills in the third week ol the spot month. For purposes ol the rule, the "third week ol 
the spot month" shall mean the week commencing on the third Monday of the spot month. Effective 
June 1983 Futures Contract; Delivery shall be made on three successive business days. The first 
delivery day shall be on the lirst day of the spot month on which a 13-week Treasury bill is issued and a 
one-year Treasury bill has 13 weeks remaining to maturity. 
REGISTERED BANKS AND OTHER FACILITIES—The Board shall establish such requirements 
and pre-conditions lor registration as a facility for the delivery of Treasury bills as il deems necessary. 
SUBSTITUTIONS—At fhe seller's option, a delivery unit may be composed of U.S. Treasury bills 
bearing maturities of 91 or 92 days (effective December 1980 Futures Contract: bearing maturities ol 
91 or 92 days from the lirst delivery day). All bills in a delivery unit must bear unilorm maturity dales. 
The following formula shall be used to calculate the value of the delivery unit; 
$1,000,000 — (days from issue date to maturity dale x T-bill yield* x $1,000,000) = dollar value 
360 
'For the purpose ol this formula, the T-bill yield shall be the dillerence between the I.M.M. index at 
settlement on the last day ol trading and 100.00, rruMiplied by 0.01. For example, a settlement pricc ol 
95.00 would create a T-bill yield o! (100.00 - 95.00) x 0.01 = .0500. 
PAYMENT—The Clearing House shall monitor the delivery procedure to ensure proper transfer of 
Treasury bills and direct payment by the buyer lo the seller. Payment shall be made on the basis of par 
value ($1,000,000) minus yield, expressed in dollars, as determined by the settling price of the futures 
contract, discounted from the final settlement date to maturity dale on a 360-day year. 
COSTS OF DELIVERY—All costs incurred in effectuating delivery shall be borne by the seller. 
SELLER'S DUTIES—The clearing member representing the seller shall deliver to the Exchange 
Clearing House by 12 noon (Chicago time) on the last day of trading a seller's delivery commitment 
indicating a Chicago (effective March 1981 Fulures Contract: or New York) bank, registered with the 
Exchange and a memtier ol the Federal Reserve System, and the name of the account from which the 
delivery unit will bo transferred. Uy 12:45 p.m. (Chicago time) on Hie day ol delivery, the seller shall 
deliver to a Chicago (elfective March 1981 Futures Contract: or New York) bank, registered with the 
Exchange and a member of the Federal Reserve System, selected by the buyer, a United Slates 
Treasury bill(s) maturing in 90 days (elleclive December 1980 Futures Contract; maturing 90 days 
from Ihe first delivery day), with a lace value at maturity of $1,000,000. 
BUYER'S DUTIES—The clearing member representing the buyer shall deliver to the Clearing House 
by 12 noon (Chicago time) on the last day ol trading a buyer's delivery commitment including the 
buyer's name and account number, and the name of a Chicago (effective March 1981 Futures 
Contracl: or New York) bank, registered with the Exchange arid a member of the Federal Reserve 
System, to which the delivery unit should be transferred, and, by 11:00 a.m. (Chicago time) on the day 
of delivery shall present to the selling clearing member's bank or its designated agent a wire transler ol 
Federal funds for the net invoicing price. 
ACCUMULATION OF POSITIONS—The positions of all accounts owned or controlled by a person or 
persons acting in concert or in which such person or persons have a proprietary or benelicial interest 
shall be cumulated. The Board may impose individual position limits lor any such account or accounts 
as it deems appropriate. 
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CONTRACT MODIFICATION—Specifications shall be as ol the first day of Itmding ol a contract 
except ttiat all deliveries must conform to government reo Jial'ons in force at tho tiiiie of delivery. II any 
U.S. governmental agency or body issues an order, ruing, directive or law porigging lo tfie trading, 
government auction, or delivery ol U.S. Treasury bills. s-'JCh order./uling. direr,|ivo or law shall be 
construed to lake precedence and become part ol these rwtes. and all open and no% contracts shall be 
subject lo such government orders. 
FAILURE TO PERFORM—If the clearing member with 3 delivery commitment falls lo perform all acts 
required by this chapter, then that clearing member shall be deemed In dolnuil, which may be 
punishable as a major violation. A clearing member in default shall be liable lo the clearing member lo 
which II was matched on the defaulted transaction (or any loss sustained. The President shall 
determine and assess losses sustained, taking into account the settling price, interest earnings 
(oregone, and such other factors as he deemed appropriate. The President may also assess such 
penalties as he deemed appropriate in addition to damages. 
EMERGENCIES, ACTS OF GOD. ACTS OF GOVERNMENT—If delivery or Acceptance or any 
precondition or requirement ol either Is prevented by strike, fire, accident, action o| government or act 
of God. the seller or buyer shall immediately notily Ihe Exchange Presidenl. If lite President deter­
mines that emergency action may be necessary, he shall call a special meeting of ihe Board of 
Governors and arrange (or the presentation ol evidence respecting Ihe emergoiicy condition. II the 
Board deterrtiines thai an emergency exists, it shall lake such action as it deems riijcessary under the 
circumstances and its decision shall be binding upon all parties to the contract, For example, and 
wilhoul limiting Ihe Board s power. II may; lake action in accordance wilh Rule 3?07; extend delivery 
dales: and designate alternate delivery points In the event ol conditions inletlotitig wilh Ihe normal 
operations of approved facilities. 
EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 1980 FUTURES CONTRACT—In the event that Ihe Board ol Governors or 
Business Conduct Commillee determines that there exists a shortage ol deliverable 13-week U.S. 
Treasury bills, it may upon a two-thirds vole of Ihe members present or upon a t wo ihirds vote of the 
members who respond to a poll lake such action as may in the Board's or Commitlba s sole discretion 
appear necessary to prevent, correct, or alleviate Ihe condition. Wilhoul limiting ihe foregoing. Ihe 
Board or Committee may: (1) designate as deliverable any specified U.S. Troas^ny bill of a maturity 
other than or In addition lo Ihe malurily specllied above and olhenvise meeting the spécifications and 
requirements staled in the rule of "Commodity Specificatioris": (2) determine a cash seulement based 
on the current cash value of a three-month U.S. Treasury bill as determined by using ihe current cash 
market yield curve for U.S. Treasury securities on llie last day of trading. 
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APPENDIX B. MEAN SQUARED ERRORS FOR REGRESSIONS ESTIMATING THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF HEDGING ANTICIPATED SPOT CD POSITIONS 
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Table B1. Mean Squared Errors for Regressions Estimating the 
Effectiveness of Hedging Anticipated Spot CD Positions. 
Not corrected for autocorrelation 
Number of Months Treasury-Bill Futures CD Futures 
Prior 
Contract 
to 
Month 
one-
week 
two-
week 
13-week 
(forward) 
13-week 
(spot) 
one- two- 13-week 
week week (forward) 
13-week 
(spot) 
1 .060 .112 - - .048 .091 - -
2 .073 .188 - - .060 .164 - -
3 .052 .152 .638 .665 .033 .099 .055 .524 
4 .097 .150 .403 1.021 .065 .113 .198 .850 
5 .077 .212 .607 .899 .074 .223 .429 .736 
6 .047 .142 .343 .859 .028 .082 .351 1.002 
7 .104 .192 .704 1.614 .097 .174 .551 1.424 
8 .082 .241 .827 1.183 .077 .243 .679 1.067 
9 .050 .148 .643 1.337 .027 .076 .594 1.301 
10 .111 .206 .889 2.104 .101 .184 .758 1.842 
11 .093 .279 .739 .857 .084 .276 .713 .888 
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Table B2. Mean Squared Errors for Regressions Estimating the 
Effectiveness of Hedging Anticipated Spot CD Positions. 
Corrected for autocorrelation 
Number of Months Treasury-Bill Futures CD Futures 
Prior 
Contract 
to 
Month 
one-
week 
two-
week 
13-week 
(forward) 
13-week 
(spot) 
one-
week 
two-
week 
13-week 
(forward) 
13-week 
(spot) 
1 .056 .106 - - .045 .088 - -
2 .071 .187 - - .057 .106 - -
: .049 .148 .572 .650 .32 .094 .045 .499 
4 .092 .144 .380 .965 .061 .108 .183 .815 
5 .075 .211 .591 .952 .071 .222 .414 .786 
6 .048 .142 .323 .814 .027 .078 .395 1.034 
7 .13 .182 .675 1.41 .09 .164 .547 1.373 
8 .079 .235 .785 1.44 .074 .241 .675 1.111 
9 .048 .151 .647 1.430 .027 .071 .570 1.313 
10 .103 .195 .839 1.98 .095 .176 .729 1.80 
11 .089 .257 .691 .834 .078 .252 .666 .842 
